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authorTamal Saha <tamal@appscode.com>2019-08-23 09:40:30 -0700
committertechknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>2019-08-23 12:40:29 -0400
commit171b3598778a1ecd0a921c71ed6755bfef68f7f0 (patch)
tree02857629ef9e8e26ee0ee559153f803f77b588b7 /vendor/gitea.com/macaron/csrf/xsrf.go
parentca6fb004ac50fc924861112403895d637c6a2d1d (diff)
downloadgitea-171b3598778a1ecd0a921c71ed6755bfef68f7f0.tar.gz
gitea-171b3598778a1ecd0a921c71ed6755bfef68f7f0.zip
Use gitea forked macaron (#7933)
Signed-off-by: Tamal Saha <tamal@appscode.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/gitea.com/macaron/csrf/xsrf.go')
-rw-r--r--vendor/gitea.com/macaron/csrf/xsrf.go97
1 files changed, 97 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/gitea.com/macaron/csrf/xsrf.go b/vendor/gitea.com/macaron/csrf/xsrf.go
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+++ b/vendor/gitea.com/macaron/csrf/xsrf.go
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+// Copyright 2012 Google Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright 2014 The Macaron Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package csrf
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "crypto/hmac"
+ "crypto/sha1"
+ "crypto/subtle"
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "fmt"
+ "strconv"
+ "strings"
+ "time"
+)
+
+// The duration that XSRF tokens are valid.
+// It is exported so clients may set cookie timeouts that match generated tokens.
+const TIMEOUT = 24 * time.Hour
+
+// clean sanitizes a string for inclusion in a token by replacing all ":"s.
+func clean(s string) string {
+ return strings.Replace(s, ":", "_", -1)
+}
+
+// GenerateToken returns a URL-safe secure XSRF token that expires in 24 hours.
+//
+// key is a secret key for your application.
+// userID is a unique identifier for the user.
+// actionID is the action the user is taking (e.g. POSTing to a particular path).
+func GenerateToken(key, userID, actionID string) string {
+ return generateTokenAtTime(key, userID, actionID, time.Now())
+}
+
+// generateTokenAtTime is like Generate, but returns a token that expires 24 hours from now.
+func generateTokenAtTime(key, userID, actionID string, now time.Time) string {
+ h := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(key))
+ fmt.Fprintf(h, "%s:%s:%d", clean(userID), clean(actionID), now.UnixNano())
+ tok := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", h.Sum(nil), now.UnixNano())
+ return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(tok))
+}
+
+// Valid returns true if token is a valid, unexpired token returned by Generate.
+func ValidToken(token, key, userID, actionID string) bool {
+ return validTokenAtTime(token, key, userID, actionID, time.Now())
+}
+
+// validTokenAtTime is like Valid, but it uses now to check if the token is expired.
+func validTokenAtTime(token, key, userID, actionID string, now time.Time) bool {
+ // Decode the token.
+ data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
+ if err != nil {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ // Extract the issue time of the token.
+ sep := bytes.LastIndex(data, []byte{':'})
+ if sep < 0 {
+ return false
+ }
+ nanos, err := strconv.ParseInt(string(data[sep+1:]), 10, 64)
+ if err != nil {
+ return false
+ }
+ issueTime := time.Unix(0, nanos)
+
+ // Check that the token is not expired.
+ if now.Sub(issueTime) >= TIMEOUT {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ // Check that the token is not from the future.
+ // Allow 1 minute grace period in case the token is being verified on a
+ // machine whose clock is behind the machine that issued the token.
+ if issueTime.After(now.Add(1 * time.Minute)) {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ expected := generateTokenAtTime(key, userID, actionID, issueTime)
+
+ // Check that the token matches the expected value.
+ // Use constant time comparison to avoid timing attacks.
+ return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(expected)) == 1
+}