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|
// Copyright (c) 2014, David Kitchen <david@buro9.com>
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
// list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
// and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
//
// * Neither the name of the organisation (Microcosm) nor the names of its
// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
// this software without specific prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
// DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
// FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
// DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
// SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
// CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
// OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
package bluemonday
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"net/url"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/net/html"
)
// Sanitize takes a string that contains a HTML fragment or document and applies
// the given policy whitelist.
//
// It returns a HTML string that has been sanitized by the policy or an empty
// string if an error has occurred (most likely as a consequence of extremely
// malformed input)
func (p *Policy) Sanitize(s string) string {
if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
return s
}
return p.sanitize(strings.NewReader(s)).String()
}
// SanitizeBytes takes a []byte that contains a HTML fragment or document and applies
// the given policy whitelist.
//
// It returns a []byte containing the HTML that has been sanitized by the policy
// or an empty []byte if an error has occurred (most likely as a consequence of
// extremely malformed input)
func (p *Policy) SanitizeBytes(b []byte) []byte {
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(b)) == 0 {
return b
}
return p.sanitize(bytes.NewReader(b)).Bytes()
}
// SanitizeReader takes an io.Reader that contains a HTML fragment or document
// and applies the given policy whitelist.
//
// It returns a bytes.Buffer containing the HTML that has been sanitized by the
// policy. Errors during sanitization will merely return an empty result.
func (p *Policy) SanitizeReader(r io.Reader) *bytes.Buffer {
return p.sanitize(r)
}
// Performs the actual sanitization process.
func (p *Policy) sanitize(r io.Reader) *bytes.Buffer {
// It is possible that the developer has created the policy via:
// p := bluemonday.Policy{}
// rather than:
// p := bluemonday.NewPolicy()
// If this is the case, and if they haven't yet triggered an action that
// would initiliaze the maps, then we need to do that.
p.init()
var (
buff bytes.Buffer
skipElementContent bool
skippingElementsCount int64
skipClosingTag bool
closingTagToSkipStack []string
mostRecentlyStartedToken string
)
tokenizer := html.NewTokenizer(r)
for {
if tokenizer.Next() == html.ErrorToken {
err := tokenizer.Err()
if err == io.EOF {
// End of input means end of processing
return &buff
}
// Raw tokenizer error
return &bytes.Buffer{}
}
token := tokenizer.Token()
switch token.Type {
case html.DoctypeToken:
if p.allowDocType {
buff.WriteString(token.String())
}
case html.CommentToken:
// Comments are ignored by default
case html.StartTagToken:
mostRecentlyStartedToken = token.Data
aps, ok := p.elsAndAttrs[token.Data]
if !ok {
if _, ok := p.setOfElementsToSkipContent[token.Data]; ok {
skipElementContent = true
skippingElementsCount++
}
if p.addSpaces {
buff.WriteString(" ")
}
break
}
if len(token.Attr) != 0 {
token.Attr = p.sanitizeAttrs(token.Data, token.Attr, aps)
}
if len(token.Attr) == 0 {
if !p.allowNoAttrs(token.Data) {
skipClosingTag = true
closingTagToSkipStack = append(closingTagToSkipStack, token.Data)
if p.addSpaces {
buff.WriteString(" ")
}
break
}
}
if !skipElementContent {
buff.WriteString(token.String())
}
case html.EndTagToken:
if skipClosingTag && closingTagToSkipStack[len(closingTagToSkipStack)-1] == token.Data {
closingTagToSkipStack = closingTagToSkipStack[:len(closingTagToSkipStack)-1]
if len(closingTagToSkipStack) == 0 {
skipClosingTag = false
}
if p.addSpaces {
buff.WriteString(" ")
}
break
}
if _, ok := p.elsAndAttrs[token.Data]; !ok {
if _, ok := p.setOfElementsToSkipContent[token.Data]; ok {
skippingElementsCount--
if skippingElementsCount == 0 {
skipElementContent = false
}
}
if p.addSpaces {
buff.WriteString(" ")
}
break
}
if !skipElementContent {
buff.WriteString(token.String())
}
case html.SelfClosingTagToken:
aps, ok := p.elsAndAttrs[token.Data]
if !ok {
if p.addSpaces {
buff.WriteString(" ")
}
break
}
if len(token.Attr) != 0 {
token.Attr = p.sanitizeAttrs(token.Data, token.Attr, aps)
}
if len(token.Attr) == 0 && !p.allowNoAttrs(token.Data) {
if p.addSpaces {
buff.WriteString(" ")
}
break
}
if !skipElementContent {
buff.WriteString(token.String())
}
case html.TextToken:
if !skipElementContent {
switch strings.ToLower(mostRecentlyStartedToken) {
case "javascript":
// not encouraged, but if a policy allows JavaScript we
// should not HTML escape it as that would break the output
buff.WriteString(token.Data)
case "style":
// not encouraged, but if a policy allows CSS styles we
// should not HTML escape it as that would break the output
buff.WriteString(token.Data)
default:
// HTML escape the text
buff.WriteString(token.String())
}
}
default:
// A token that didn't exist in the html package when we wrote this
return &bytes.Buffer{}
}
}
}
// sanitizeAttrs takes a set of element attribute policies and the global
// attribute policies and applies them to the []html.Attribute returning a set
// of html.Attributes that match the policies
func (p *Policy) sanitizeAttrs(
elementName string,
attrs []html.Attribute,
aps map[string]attrPolicy,
) []html.Attribute {
if len(attrs) == 0 {
return attrs
}
// Builds a new attribute slice based on the whether the attribute has been
// whitelisted explicitly or globally.
cleanAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
for _, htmlAttr := range attrs {
// Is there an element specific attribute policy that applies?
if ap, ok := aps[htmlAttr.Key]; ok {
if ap.regexp != nil {
if ap.regexp.MatchString(htmlAttr.Val) {
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
continue
}
} else {
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
continue
}
}
// Is there a global attribute policy that applies?
if ap, ok := p.globalAttrs[htmlAttr.Key]; ok {
if ap.regexp != nil {
if ap.regexp.MatchString(htmlAttr.Val) {
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
} else {
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
}
}
if len(cleanAttrs) == 0 {
// If nothing was allowed, let's get out of here
return cleanAttrs
}
// cleanAttrs now contains the attributes that are permitted
if linkable(elementName) {
if p.requireParseableURLs {
// Ensure URLs are parseable:
// - a.href
// - area.href
// - link.href
// - blockquote.cite
// - q.cite
// - img.src
// - script.src
tmpAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
switch elementName {
case "a", "area", "link":
if htmlAttr.Key == "href" {
if u, ok := p.validURL(htmlAttr.Val); ok {
htmlAttr.Val = u
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
break
}
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
case "blockquote", "q":
if htmlAttr.Key == "cite" {
if u, ok := p.validURL(htmlAttr.Val); ok {
htmlAttr.Val = u
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
break
}
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
case "img", "script":
if htmlAttr.Key == "src" {
if u, ok := p.validURL(htmlAttr.Val); ok {
htmlAttr.Val = u
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
break
}
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
default:
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
}
cleanAttrs = tmpAttrs
}
if (p.requireNoFollow ||
p.requireNoFollowFullyQualifiedLinks ||
p.addTargetBlankToFullyQualifiedLinks) &&
len(cleanAttrs) > 0 {
// Add rel="nofollow" if a "href" exists
switch elementName {
case "a", "area", "link":
var hrefFound bool
var externalLink bool
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
if htmlAttr.Key == "href" {
hrefFound = true
u, err := url.Parse(htmlAttr.Val)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if u.Host != "" {
externalLink = true
}
continue
}
}
if hrefFound {
var (
noFollowFound bool
targetBlankFound bool
)
addNoFollow := (p.requireNoFollow ||
externalLink && p.requireNoFollowFullyQualifiedLinks)
addTargetBlank := (externalLink &&
p.addTargetBlankToFullyQualifiedLinks)
tmpAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
var appended bool
if htmlAttr.Key == "rel" && addNoFollow {
if strings.Contains(htmlAttr.Val, "nofollow") {
noFollowFound = true
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
appended = true
} else {
htmlAttr.Val += " nofollow"
noFollowFound = true
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
appended = true
}
}
if elementName == "a" && htmlAttr.Key == "target" {
if htmlAttr.Val == "_blank" {
targetBlankFound = true
}
if addTargetBlank && !targetBlankFound {
htmlAttr.Val = "_blank"
targetBlankFound = true
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
appended = true
}
}
if !appended {
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
}
if noFollowFound || targetBlankFound {
cleanAttrs = tmpAttrs
}
if addNoFollow && !noFollowFound {
rel := html.Attribute{}
rel.Key = "rel"
rel.Val = "nofollow"
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, rel)
}
if elementName == "a" && addTargetBlank && !targetBlankFound {
rel := html.Attribute{}
rel.Key = "target"
rel.Val = "_blank"
targetBlankFound = true
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, rel)
}
if targetBlankFound {
// target="_blank" has a security risk that allows the
// opened window/tab to issue JavaScript calls against
// window.opener, which in effect allow the destination
// of the link to control the source:
// https://dev.to/ben/the-targetblank-vulnerability-by-example
//
// To mitigate this risk, we need to add a specific rel
// attribute if it is not already present.
// rel="noopener"
//
// Unfortunately this is processing the rel twice (we
// already looked at it earlier ^^) as we cannot be sure
// of the ordering of the href and rel, and whether we
// have fully satisfied that we need to do this. This
// double processing only happens *if* target="_blank"
// is true.
var noOpenerAdded bool
tmpAttrs := []html.Attribute{}
for _, htmlAttr := range cleanAttrs {
var appended bool
if htmlAttr.Key == "rel" {
if strings.Contains(htmlAttr.Val, "noopener") {
noOpenerAdded = true
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
} else {
htmlAttr.Val += " noopener"
noOpenerAdded = true
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
appended = true
}
if !appended {
tmpAttrs = append(tmpAttrs, htmlAttr)
}
}
if noOpenerAdded {
cleanAttrs = tmpAttrs
} else {
// rel attr was not found, or else noopener would
// have been added already
rel := html.Attribute{}
rel.Key = "rel"
rel.Val = "noopener"
cleanAttrs = append(cleanAttrs, rel)
}
}
}
default:
}
}
}
return cleanAttrs
}
func (p *Policy) allowNoAttrs(elementName string) bool {
_, ok := p.setOfElementsAllowedWithoutAttrs[elementName]
return ok
}
func (p *Policy) validURL(rawurl string) (string, bool) {
if p.requireParseableURLs {
// URLs do not contain whitespace
if strings.Contains(rawurl, " ") ||
strings.Contains(rawurl, "\t") ||
strings.Contains(rawurl, "\n") {
return "", false
}
u, err := url.Parse(rawurl)
if err != nil {
return "", false
}
if u.Scheme != "" {
urlPolicy, ok := p.allowURLSchemes[u.Scheme]
if !ok {
return "", false
}
if urlPolicy == nil || urlPolicy(u) == true {
return u.String(), true
}
return "", false
}
if p.allowRelativeURLs {
if u.String() != "" {
return u.String(), true
}
}
return "", false
}
return rawurl, true
}
func linkable(elementName string) bool {
switch elementName {
case "a", "area", "blockquote", "img", "link", "script":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
|