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Add tests for the host checking logic, clarify the behaviors (#20328)

Before, the combination of AllowedDomains/BlockedDomains/AllowLocalNetworks is confusing.

This PR adds tests for the logic, clarify the behaviors.
tags/v1.18.0-rc0
wxiaoguang 1 year ago
parent
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f67a1030b3
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+ 1
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custom/conf/app.example.ini View File

;BLOCKED_DOMAINS = ;BLOCKED_DOMAINS =
;; ;;
;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default) ;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default)
;; If a domain is allowed by ALLOWED_DOMAINS, this option will be ignored.
;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false ;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false


;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

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docs/content/doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md View File

- `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds) - `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds)
- `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`. - `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`.
- `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported. - `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported.
- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291
- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291. If a domain is allowed by `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, this option will be ignored.
- `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify - `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify


## Federation (`federation`) ## Federation (`federation`)

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modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go View File



// MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list // MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list
func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool { func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool {
if hl == nil {
return false
}

hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host) hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
hostname = host hostname = host
} }

if hl == nil {
return false
}
if hl.checkPattern(hostname) { if hl.checkPattern(hostname) {
return true return true
} }

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- 3
services/migrations/migrate.go View File



// some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error // some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error
addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName) addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName)
return checkByAllowBlockList(hostName, addrList)
}


func checkByAllowBlockList(hostName string, addrList []net.IP) error {
var ipAllowed bool var ipAllowed bool
var ipBlocked bool var ipBlocked bool
for _, addr := range addrList { for _, addr := range addrList {
} }
var blockedError error var blockedError error
if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked { if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked {
blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true}
blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
} }
// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list first
// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list before return to get the more accurate error
if !allowList.IsEmpty() { if !allowList.IsEmpty() {
if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed { if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed {
return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true}
return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
} }
} }
// otherwise, we always follow the blocked list // otherwise, we always follow the blocked list
allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate) allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate)
allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback) allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback)
} }
// TODO: at the moment, if ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false, ALLOWED_DOMAINS=domain.com, and domain.com has IP 127.0.0.1, then it's still allowed.
// if we want to block such case, the private&loopback should be added to the blockList when ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false
return nil return nil
} }

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services/migrations/migrate_test.go View File

package migrations package migrations


import ( import (
"net"
"path/filepath" "path/filepath"
"testing" "testing"




setting.ImportLocalPaths = old setting.ImportLocalPaths = old
} }

func TestAllowBlockList(t *testing.T) {
init := func(allow, block string, local bool) {
setting.Migrations.AllowedDomains = allow
setting.Migrations.BlockedDomains = block
setting.Migrations.AllowLocalNetworks = local
assert.NoError(t, Init())
}

// default, allow all external, block none, no local networks
init("", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// allow all including local networks (it could lead to SSRF in production)
init("", "", true)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// allow wildcard, block some subdomains. if the domain name is allowed, then the local network check is skipped
init("*.domain.com", "blocked.domain.com", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("blocked.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.other.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))

// allow wildcard (it could lead to SSRF in production)
init("*", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// local network can still be blocked
init("*", "127.0.0.*", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// reset
init("", "", false)
}

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