OC::$WEBROOT can be empty in case if your nextcloud installation has no url prefix. This will result in an empty Location Header.
in other areas OC::$WEBROOT is always used together with an /
Format control structures, classes, methods and function
To continue this formatting madness, here's a tiny patch that adds
unified formatting for control structures like if and loops as well as
classes, their methods and anonymous functions. This basically forces
the constructs to start on the same line. This is not exactly what PSR2
wants, but I think we can have a few exceptions with "our" style. The
starting of braces on the same line is pracrically standard for our
code.
This also removes and empty lines from method/function bodies at the
beginning and end.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Wurst <christoph@winzerhof-wurst.at>
* Order the imports
* No leading slash on imports
* Empty line before namespace
* One line per import
* Empty after imports
* Emmpty line at bottom of file
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
With upcoming work for the feature policy header. Splitting this in
smaller classes that just do 1 thing makes sense.
I rather have a few small classes that are tiny and do 1 thing right
(and we all understand what is going on) than have big ones.
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
Using file will overwrite the $file parameter in the template base.
Leading to trying to include a file that is the exception message. Which
will of course fail.
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
This makes the new `@BruteForceProtection` annotation more clever and moves the relevant code into it's own middleware.
Basically you can now set `@BruteForceProtection(action=$key)` as annotation and that will make the controller bruteforce protected. However, the difference to before is that you need to call `$responmse->throttle()` to increase the counter. Before the counter was increased every time which leads to all kind of unexpected problems.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
This allows adding rate limiting via annotations to controllers, as one example:
```
@UserRateThrottle(limit=5, period=100)
@AnonRateThrottle(limit=1, period=100)
```
Would mean that logged-in users can access the page 5 times within 100 seconds, and anonymous users 1 time within 100 seconds. If only an AnonRateThrottle is specified that one will also be applied to logged-in users.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
* Move a-b to PSR-4
* Move c-d to PSR-4
* Move e+g to PSR-4
* Move h-l to PSR-4
* Move m-r to PSR-4
* Move s-u to PSR-4
* Move files/ to PSR-4
* Move remaining tests to PSR-4
* Remove Test\ from old autoloader
Add public API to give developers the possibility to adjust the global CSP defaults
Allows to inject something into the default content policy. This is for
example useful when you're injecting Javascript code into a view belonging
to another controller and cannot modify its Content-Security-Policy itself.
Note that the adjustment is only applied to applications that use AppFramework
controllers.
To use this from your `app.php` use `\OC::$server->getContentSecurityPolicyManager()->addDefaultPolicy($policy)`,
$policy has to be of type `\OCP\AppFramework\Http\ContentSecurityPolicy`.
To test this add something like the following into an `app.php` of any enabled app:
```
$manager = \OC::$server->getContentSecurityPolicyManager();
$policy = new \OCP\AppFramework\Http\ContentSecurityPolicy(false);
$policy->addAllowedFrameDomain('asdf');
$policy->addAllowedScriptDomain('yolo.com');
$policy->allowInlineScript(false);
$manager->addDefaultPolicy($policy);
$policy = new \OCP\AppFramework\Http\ContentSecurityPolicy(false);
$policy->addAllowedFontDomain('yolo.com');
$manager->addDefaultPolicy($policy);
$policy = new \OCP\AppFramework\Http\ContentSecurityPolicy(false);
$policy->addAllowedFrameDomain('banana.com');
$manager->addDefaultPolicy($policy);
```
If you now open the files app the policy should be:
```
Content-Security-Policy:default-src 'none';script-src yolo.com 'self' 'unsafe-eval';style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';img-src 'self' data: blob:;font-src yolo.com 'self';connect-src 'self';media-src 'self';frame-src asdf banana.com 'self'
```
While BREACH requires the following three factors to be effectively exploitable we should add another mitigation:
1. Application must support HTTP compression
2. Response most reflect user-controlled input
3. Response should contain sensitive data
Especially part 2 is with ownCloud not really given since user-input is usually only echoed if a CSRF token has been passed.
To reduce the risk even further it is however sensible to encrypt the CSRF token with a shared secret. Since this will change on every request an attack such as BREACH is not feasible anymore against the CSRF token at least.
Refactor OC_Request into TrustedDomainHelper and IRequest
This changeset removes the static class `OC_Request` and moves the functions either into `IRequest` which is accessible via `\OC::$server::->getRequest()` or into a separated `TrustedDomainHelper` class for some helper methods which should not be publicly exposed.
This changes only internal methods and nothing on the public API. Some public functions in `util.php` have been deprecated though in favour of the new non-static functions.
Unfortunately some part of this code uses things like `__DIR__` and thus is not completely unit-testable. Where tests where possible they ahve been added though.
Fixes https://github.com/owncloud/core/issues/13976 which was requested in https://github.com/owncloud/core/pull/13973#issuecomment-73492969
Respect `mod_unique_id` and refactor `OC_Request::getRequestId`
When `mod_unique_id` is enabled the ID generated by it will be used for logging. This allows for correlation of the Apache logs and the ownCloud logs.
Testplan:
- [ ] When `mod_unique_id` is enabled the request ID equals the one generated by `mod_unique_id`.
- [ ] When `mod_unique_id` is not available the request ID is a 20 character long random string
- [ ] The generated Id is stable over the lifespan of one request
Changeset looks a little bit larger since I had to adjust every unit test using the HTTP\Request class for proper DI.
Fixes https://github.com/owncloud/core/issues/13366
Carl Schwan
Joas Schilling
Christoph Wurst
Morris Jobke
Holger Hees
Roeland Jago Douma
Bjoern Schiessle
Lukas Reschke
Joas Schilling
Joas Schilling
Roeland Jago Douma
Lukas Reschke