The method it overloads got tweaked some time ago, so we need to make
sure this method follows suit.

Sends response for SetDesktopSize as per the community wiki
specification

We'll just crash later if we try to use such a large screen, so reject
the request from the client instead and keep the server running.

Created a new subclass of Exception called GAIException() that will
handle error messages from getaddrinfo() instead of letting Exception()
handle it. GAIException() will make use of gai_strerror() to map the
error code to text. On Windows, gai_strerrorW() must be used if the text
is encoded with UTF-8.

The previous error messages did not support Unicode characters. This
commit will use UTF-8 encoding to be able to display error messages in
every language.

It is present on all UNIX systems anyway, so let's simplify things.
We will need it for more proper session startup anyway.

There are multiple "okay" return values, not just Z_OK. Make sure we
don't bail out needlessly.

Modern MinGW seems to provide this, so simplify things a bit. This also
side steps some of the issue of the windows.h/winsock2.h include
ordering.

Otherwise such clients cannot use Scroll Lock at all, and that is
probably worse than any effects we might get from getting out of sync.

new throws an exception on allocation errors rather than return NULL.

This check is completely backwards and it is currently unknown how
this ever worked.

There might be more bytes left in the current TLS record, even if
there is nothing on the underlying stream. Make sure we properly
return this when we aren't being requested to block.

The copied rects have already been merged in to the changed rects
at this point if the client doesn't support the CopyRect encoding.

Our fast paths assume that each channel fits in to a separate byte.
That means the shift needs to be a multiple of 8. Start actually
checking this so that a client cannot trip us up and possibly cause
incorrect code exection.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.

We use a lot of lengths given to us over the network, so be more
paranoid about them causing an overflow as otherwise an attacker
might trick us in to overwriting other memory.

This primarily affects the client which often gets lengths from the
server, but there are also some scenarios where the server might
theoretically be vulnerable.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.

Provides safety against them accidentally becoming negative because
of bugs in the calculations.

Also does the same to CharArray and friends as they were strongly
connection to the stream objects.

Otherwise we might be tricked in to reading and writing things at
incorrect offsets for pixels which ultimately could result in an
attacker writing things to the stack or heap and executing things
they shouldn't.

This only affects the server as the client never uses the pixel
format suggested by th server.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.

We always assumed there would be one pixel per row so a rect with
a zero width would result in us writing to unknown memory.

This could theoretically be used by a malicious server to inject
code in to the viewer process.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.

No one should every try to write to this buffer. Enforce that by
throwing an exception if any one tries to get a writeable pointer
to the data.

We do a lot of calculations based on pixel coordinates and we need
to make sure they do not overflow. Restrict the maximum dimensions
we support rather than try to switch over all calculations to use
64 bit integers.

This prevents attackers from from injecting code by specifying a
huge framebuffer size and relying on the values overflowing to
access invalid areas of the heap.

This primarily affects the client which gets both the screen
dimensions and the pixel contents from the remote side. But the
server might also be affected as a client can adjust the screen
dimensions, as can applications inside the session.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.

Don't allow subclasses to just override dimensions or buffer details
directly and instead force them to go via methods. This allows us
to do sanity checks on the new values and catch bugs and attacks.

Move the checks around to avoid missing cases where we might access
memory that is no longer valid. Also avoid touching the underlying
stream implicitly (e.g. via the destructor) as it might also no
longer be valid.

A malicious server could theoretically use this for remote code
execution in the client.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab

We need to examine the incoming PixelBuffer, not the previous one
(which might not even be valid).

We need to check the buffer length before accessing the incoming
string. Probably not a problem in practice as there should be a
final null in most incoming strings.

Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab.

The new order of test avoid ready invalid memory address in ca.buf

Implements support in both client and server for the extended
clipboard format first seen in UltraVNC. Currently only implements
text handling, but that is still an improvement as it extends the
clipboard from ISO 8859-1 to full Unicode.

In prepartion for better clipboard extensions that can send Unicode
data between the client and server.

Change the internal clipboard API to use a request based model in
order to be prepared for more advanced clipboard transfers.

We convert between UTF-8 and ISO 8859-1 (latin 1) in several places
so create some common routines for this.

We now filter incoming data, which means we can start assuming the
clipboard data is always null terminated. This allows us to clean
up a lot of the internal handling.

This is required by the protocol so we should make sure it is
enforced. We are tolerant of clients that violate this though and
convert incoming clipboard data.

It was unused and added complexity and bugs to the code. So let's
remove it rather than trying to clean up a function no one needed.

We will log the exception, so avoid direct writes to stderr by
simply removing these log lines.

Result of overflow on signed integer arithmetic is undefined in C/C++ standard.
So in previous version clang was compiling the statement as (int)a > (int)b (i.e. assuming no overflow), which leads to incorrect result.

Correct deterministic behavior means doing overflow arithmetic as unsigned, i.e.
 a != b && a - b <= UINT_MAX / 2

There is some bug in gcc's new -Werror=format-overflow that makes it
think majorVersion could end up being very large. Increase the target
buffer for now to keep gcc happy.

This provides some basic rate limiting that will make it difficult
for an attacker to brute force passwords. Only relevant when the
blacklist is disabled as otherwise the attacker only gets a very
limited number of attempts.

It is not enough to create an exception object, you need to throw
it as well.

There might be multiple clients using a single IP (e.g. NAT), which
can make the blacklist do more harm than good. So add a setting to
disable it if needed.

No need to expose these, so keep them internal to the implementation,
like most settings are.