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owncloud/issue-15975-occ-encryption-enable-warning-no-module
Display a message when there is a problem with the default module
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make sure that we keep the correct encrypted-flag and the (unencrypted)size
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if a file gets copied
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Allow user to set an empty email address
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owncloud/issue-15771-dont-restrict-permissions-for-share-owner
Do not restrict permissions for the original owner
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skip user if we don't have a public key
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Correctly generate the feedback URL for remote share
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Password set via OCS API should not be double escaped
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We don't want to have users misusing this API resulting in a potential file disclosure of "avatar.(jpg|png)" files.
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Propagate etags across shared storages
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Adjust isLocal() on encryption wrapper
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[encryption] handle encrypted files correctly which where encrypted with a old version of ownCloud (<=oc6)
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encrypted file without a header
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Fix collision on temporary files + adjust permissions
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This changeset hardens the temporary file and directory creation to address multiple problems that may lead to exposure of files to other users, data loss or other unexpected behaviour that is impossible to debug.
**[CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/668.html)**
The temporary file and folder handling as implemented in ownCloud is performed using a MD5 hash over `time()` concatenated with `rand()`. This is insufficiently and leads to the following security problems:
The generated filename could already be used by another user. It is not verified whether the file is already used and thus temporary files might be used for another user as well resulting in all possible stuff such as "user has file of other user".
Effectively this leaves us with:
1. A timestamp based on seconds (no entropy at all)
2. `rand()` which returns usually a number between 0 and 2,147,483,647
Considering the birthday paradox and that we use this method quite often (especially when handling external storage) this is quite error prone and needs to get addressed.
This behaviour has been fixed by using `tempnam` instead for single temporary files. For creating temporary directories an additional postfix will be appended, the solution is for directories still not absolutely bulletproof but the best I can think about at the moment. Improvement suggestions are welcome.
**[CWE-378: Creation of Temporary File With Insecure Permissions](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/378.html)**
Files were created using `touch()` which defaults to a permission of 0644. Thus other users on the machine may read potentially sensitive information as `/tmp/` is world-readable. However, ownCloud always encourages users to use a dedicated machine to run the ownCloud instance and thus this is no a high severe issue. Permissions have been adjusted to 0600.
**[CWE-379: Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Incorrect Permissions](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/379.html)**
Files were created using `mkdir()` which defaults to a permission of 0777. Thus other users on the machine may read potentially sensitive information as `/tmp/` is world-readable. However, ownCloud always encourages users to use a dedicated machine to run the ownCloud instance and thus this is no a high severe issue. Permissions have been adjusted to 0700.Please enter the commit message for your changes.
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Block old legacy clients
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In case of an not sent UA header consider the client as valid
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This Pull Request introduces a SabreDAV plugin that will block all older clients than 1.6.1 to connect and sync with the ownCloud instance.
This has multiple reasons:
1. Old ownCloud client versions before 1.6.0 are not properly working with sticky cookies for load balancers and thus generating sessions en masse
2. Old ownCloud client versions tend to be horrible buggy
In some cases we had in 80minutes about 10'000 sessions created by a single user. While this change set does not really "fix" the problem as 3rdparty legacy clients are affected as well, it is a good work-around and hopefully should force users to update their client
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